The Persian Wars to the Fall of Athens
Bibliotheca historica, Books 11-14.34
Diodorus Siculus
Translated from the Greek by Peter Green
(University of Texas, 2010) [c.50 BC]
348 p.
The two great historians of the ancient Greek world are Herodotus and Thucydides. The former gave us a history that set the stage for and recounted the events of the Greco-Persian wars that ended in 480 BC, and the latter recounted (most of) the Peloponnesian War, which began in 431 BC, but between the two of them there lies a gap of fifty years — fifty years of great interest, being in numerous respects the golden age of Athens, in which the high repute in which she was held for her role in defeating the Persians brought her honour and wealth, much of which was undone by the decades-long struggle of the Peloponnesian War.
Into the breach steps Diodorus Siculus, a first-century BC writer whose massive historical project, the Biblioteca historica, covers events in and around the Mediterranean from the Trojan War down to the life of Julius Caesar. Of its 40 books, 15 have survived to our time, including those, Books 11-14, which treat of Greece in the 5th century BC.
It is perhaps unfortunate, given our wish to rely on him, that Diodorus comes to us with a distinctly malodorous reputation. He was admired, it is true, in the first few centuries after he wrote — both St. Jerome and St. Justin Martyr spoke well of him — but in the last couple of centuries, since the onset of historical criticism in German scholarship, his star has declined. The critics have been unsparing: he was a “miserable scribbler”, said Wilamowitz; “a flat and foolish pen-pusher”, said Soltau; Nock thought him “a small man with pretensions”, while Macaulay judged him “a stupid, credulous, prosing old ass”, and, piling on a bit, Niebuhr pronounced him “naive, unlearned, totally spiritless, without judgment, silly, incompetent…” and so forth. The point is clear enough: Diodorus Siculus was a bad historian.
So goes the consensus, but Peter Green, translator of this volume, and as eminent a classicist as you’re likely to find, does not agree, and he has produced this book in an attempt to set Diodorus’ project before us once again, sustained by a scaffolding of scholarly notes.
He grants that Diodorus makes errors — he tries to align Greek history and Roman history, for instance, but he’s off by a few years — but argues that at least some of these mistakes can be attributed to the manuscript being, here and there, still in draft when Diodorus died. Earlier critics accused Diodorus of being not much more than a bad copyist, but Green argues that in fact his work shows considerable evidence of original research and that his reliance on previous historians has been exaggerated. And he believes, finally, that, despite some flaws, given the paucity of evidence about this inter-war period in Greece we ought not to look a gift historian in the mouth.
That scholarly dispute is an interesting one, but more important for casual readers like us is whether we learn something from reading Diodorus, and whether we enjoy ourselves as we read. And I think we do, in many ways. For example, in the early parts of Book 11 he narrates the run-up to the Persian invasion and he gives this detail about inter-Greek politics:
The Argives sent ambassadors to the allied congress, announcing that they would join the alliance if offered a share of the command. To which the delegates responded in plain terms that if the Argives thought it worse to have a Greek general than a barbarian master, they were right to remain neutral; but if they aspired to take over the leadership of the Hellenes, they should (said the delegates) have performed deeds deserving of such an honor before applying for it.
A delightful reply! And I don’t remember seeing it in Herodotus.
At Thermopylae Xerxes offered, as was his custom, to make terms with King Leonidas and the Spartans before the battle began:
[Xerxes] ordered them to make the following proclamation: “King Xerxes orders everyone to surrender their arms, to go back under safe-conduct to their native country, and to be allies of the Persians; and if they do this,” the proclamation continued, “he will grant them more and better land than that they now possess.”
We know that his offer was refused, but I don’t recall it being refused in these gallant terms:
But when Leonidas and his companions heard what the messengers had to say, they replied that if they were to be the king’s allies, they would be of more use to him fully armed, and if they were compelled to wage war against him, they would do battle for freedom all the better through keeping their weapons; and as for the lands he promised to give them, it was a tradition with the Greeks to gain lands not by cowardice but by valor.
Much later, during the throes of the Peloponnesian War, Diodorus tells us of the great sea battle that took place between the Athenians and the Syracusans in the harbour of Syracuse, and it is told with particularly vivid attention to the human scale and human cost of the struggle:
The spectators upon the walls gave great shouts when they discerned any advantage gained by their friends; but when they were in danger of being overcome, they filled the air with doleful groans and lamentations, calling upon their gods for deliverance. Sometimes some of the galleys of the Syracusans were destroyed under the very walls, and their kindred and relations were the eye-witnesses of the death of their children, wives of the miserable ends of their husbands, and brothers of their brothers.
All this I would put on the positive side of the ledger. But there is a negative side too, easier to state: I often had a hard time understanding what was going on. Diodorus is an annalist, going year by year, and while this makes it relatively simple to keep the chronological order of the story straight, it’s less easy to follow a single story arc across multiple years, as it gets mixed up with other story arcs. For instance, Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian war cuts off in 411, six years before the war ended; Diodorus covers the whole thing, but, having read the book, even if you offered me a nice plate of taramasalata and souvlaki, I could not tell you how it ended. Individual historical figures did not often emerge from the fabric with distinctive character, and that’s fairly disappointing considering that his story involves a host of fascinating people, including Pericles, Sophocles, and Socrates. The whole affair left me with the impression of its being a bit of a ramble. That’s not a comment on his historical reliability, which I’m not qualified to adjudicate, but just on his style and manner.
These problems were severe enough that, in the end, I found Diodorus Siculus more disappointing than otherwise. My principal reason for reading him — for an account of the inter-war period — was left mostly unsatisfied, and, though I appreciated certain aspects of the book, I found it, on the whole, lacking character and art.